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Abstract
Stephen Hawking, among others, has proposed that the topological stability of a
property of spacetime is a necessary condition for it to be physically significant. What
counts as stable, however, depends crucially on the choice of topology. Some physicists
have thus suggested that one should find a canonical topology, a single ‘right’ topology
for every inquiry. While certain such choices might be initially motivated, some little-
discussed examples of Robert Geroch and some propositions of my own show that the
main candidates—and each possible choice, to some extent—faces the horns of a no-go
result. I suggest that instead of trying to decide what the ‘right’ topology is for all
problems, one should let the details of particular types of problems guide the choice of
an appropriate topology.
1 Introduction
There are many reasons to consider notions of similarity in philosophy and, more specifically,
philosophy of science. They underlie Lewis’s famous system for counterfactual semantics,
modal logic, laws of nature and causation ([1973]; [1986]). More recently, Halvorson ([2012])
has suggested that similarity is salient for characterizing scientific theories formally: one
cannot recover a theory from its models unless one encodes the similarity amongst the mod-
els’ truth-valuations topologically. And in philosophy of physics, Manchak ([unpublished])
has remarked that placing a topology on the models of general relativity can describe how
different possible relativistic worlds (i.e., relativistic spacetimes) are ‘nearby’ one another.
This topological approach to similarity has been used by physicists working in mathe-
matical relativity since the 1970s. In this context the notion of stability has been crucial.
Roughly, a property of an object O of a specified class (like mathematical models, solutions
to a differential equation, etc.) is stable when all objects in that class sufficiently similar to
O also have that property—the name ‘stability’ comes from the intuitive picture that the
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property is preserved under arbitrary (but sufficiently small) perturbations. In this paper I
am interested in exploring how this literature connects similarity—in particular, stability—
with judgments of physical significance. For example, Hawking has asserted that ‘the only
properties of space-time that are physically significant are those that are stable in some ap-
propriate topology’1 and that ‘[f]or physical purposes it is sufficient to prove that a theorem
holds generically’ ([1971], p. 395).
One attraction of Hawking’s proposal is that, given an ‘appropriate topology’, it would
seem to reduce part of a philosophical question to a technical question: in certain cases,
instead of puzzling over whether a property is ‘physically significant’, one instead may
determine on which sets it is unstable; instead of assessing the import of apparent iso-
lated counterexamples to a theorem, one simply proves that the theorem holds generically.
Whether this reduction is successful, however, depends first on justifying why there should
be a connection between physical significance and topological stability at all. Then, given a
satisfactory justification, one must explicate what an ‘appropriate topology’ is supposed to
be. After addressing the former query in §2, I focus on the latter in the remainder. Since
a choice of topology on spacetimes encodes particular ways in which those spacetimes are
similar, an appropriate topology is one that gets this notion of similarity right. While it
would greatly simplify matters if there were a canonical such topology, in §3–4 I consider
two classes of topologies often considered in the literature and find them flawed for this
purpose. (The propositions I prove to argue this point may be of independent foundational
interest.) Against suggestions from some physicists, in §5 I suggest instead that there cannot
be a canonical topology, and that an ‘appropriate’ topology must covary with the context
of inquiry. Without a canonical topology, however, stability itself does not directly settle
any conceptual questions about what is physically significant. Rather, whether a property
counts as physically significant in a model depends upon the prior choice of topology—how
one considers models to be relevantly similar.
2 Similarity, Topology, and Physical Significance
What does it mean to say that a property is physically significant? There is not likely any
straightforward univocal concept that wholly underlies the broad use of this phrase in the
physics literature, but it will suffice here to draw out some of its connections with epistemic
warrant and stability.2 Physicists use mathematical models to represent physical phenom-
ena, including past observations and potential predictions. But they must be judicious in
using models to make inferences about phenomena, as models are often idealized or only
approximate. ‘Physical significance’ expresses an aspect of this partial connection between
models and phenomena. One says that a property of a model of physical phenomena is phys-
ically significant to the degree to which one has warrant to infer that property about the
physical phenomena. For instance, one would say that the past singularity of the standard
cosmological model is physically significant to the extent that one can infer about the actual
universe that there is a past singularity, the Big Bang.
1See also (Geroch [1971], p. 70) and (Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 197).
2I take myself to be making some tentative suggestions rather than undertaking any robust project of
conceptual analysis.
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The connection with stability becomes evident in considering that the observed data
used to build such models, based on quantities like length, energy and position, are typi-
cally imprecise. Imprecise data usually yield imprecise models, or rather a range of models
compatible with the data’s imprecision. For convenience, however, scientists typically build
a single model and represent the imprecision in other ways. But the inferences warranted
through that model must cohere with the inferences one would have made through the range
of models—that is, these inferences must be compatible not just with the observed data, but
also with the whole set of data values falling within the measurements’ range of imprecision.
Thus any inferences that crucially depend on perfectly precise data will never be warranted.
Requiring the stability of a property as a necessary condition for its physical significance
enforces this compatibility between imprecise data and the inferences one draws: the only
properties about phenomena one can infer from a model are those that all arbitrarily similar
models share.3
Returning to the example above, the data cosmologists have of the universe is imprecise,
with a range of compatible cosmological models, including the standard one and a neighbor-
hood of models similar to it. The standard model has a past singularity, and so one may
inquire whether one has warrant to infer about the actual universe that there was a Big Bang.
The requirement of stability would demand for such an inference that some neighborhood
of cosmological models similar to the standard one also have a past singularity. For, one
might argue, the data available is compatible with at least some such neighborhood, and any
inferences about the world one draws should not depend on which data-compatible model
one chooses. Things seem to turn out fortunately for the conclusions of standard cosmology,
as there is in fact a sense in which the past singularity of the standard cosmological model
is stable.4
It is important to contrast the epistemological character of physical significance as such
with the more metaphysical character of being ‘physically (un)reasonable’ (Smeenk and
Wu¨thrich [2011]; Manchak [2011]; Earman [1995], ch. 3.4) or just plain ‘(un)physical’ (Norton
[2008], §3.2). Although physicists do not usually explicitly distinguish these, they tend to say
that a model is physically unreasonable when they wish to exclude it as a genuine physical
possibility countenanced by a theory. By contrast, physical significance tends to refer to
the warrant to infer properties of physical phenomena from a model. There are interesting
connections to explore between the physically significant and the physically reasonable,5 but
the following discussion shall focus on the former.
In order to apply the stability criterion for physical significance precisely, one should
formalize the notion of similarity it depends upon. Topology is a natural choice.6 A topology
on a class of objects determines notions of convergence and continuity, respectively, for
3Stability plays an analogous role in securing inference under idealization. Scientists often use idealized
models to make inference more tractable. In these cases, one would like to infer properties of phenomena the
de-idealized model represents from those of the idealized model. Even if the idealization is not too severe,
such an inference will not be warranted unless the property in question is stable.
4Specifically, the property of the standard cosmological model that each inextendible timelike geodesic is
past incomplete is stable in the C2 open topology (Lerner [1973], theorem 6.1) introduced in §3.
5See, for example, (Fletcher [2012], §3.1) for such connections in the case of excluding the indeterministic
trajectories of Norton’s dome ([2008]).
6Many other choices, like uniform spaces, are strictly stronger than a topology, so one expects at least to
reckon with topological structure.
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sequences and parameterized families of such objects, using its system of open neighborhoods
to encode a weak sense of similarity. A property P of an object O (or, more generally, of
each of a set of objects {Oα}) is then stable just in case there is an open set containing O
(resp. {Oα}), all of whose members also have P .7 Further, property P holds generically on
a collection S when it holds on an open subset of S that is dense in S. Density ensures that
elements of S that do not have P do so unstably, and openness ensures that elements that
do have P do so stably.
However, if the collection of objects is infinite, as is the case with relativistic spacetimes,
then there will be infinitely many topologies one can place on the collection, topologies that
can differ regarding whether a property is stable or generic on a subcollection. How can one
decide which topology is appropriate?8 Perhaps there is in fact a canonical topology: a single
choice of topology over the collection of relativistic spacetimes that should apply whenever
such a topology is needed. Such a position had at one time been suggested by Geroch,
who writes, ‘It is important, I feel, that one settles on one (or possibly two) topologies
in which to work rather than discovering a new topology for each new theorem’ ([(1970],
p. 269),9 and more strongly by Lerner ([(1972], [1973]) and Lerner and Porter, who advocate
for a particular choice: ‘if one regards all Lorentz metrics on M as being on an equal
(mathematical [sic] footing, it appears that the only acceptable choice for a topology is the
Whitney fine Ck topology’ ([1974], p. 1413). Those familiar with Lewis’s ([1986]) influential
(albeit controversial) analysis of comparative similarity for possible worlds based on laws
of nature and particular matters of fact might also wonder if a similar general analysis
might be given for relativistic spacetimes. In the remainder I investigate the viability of this
canonicalism about topologies over spacetime, considering Lerner’s choice in §3 and another
initially plausible class of candidates in §4. In examining the problems each faces, the case
against canonicalism will emerge.
3 The Open Topologies
Recall that a relativistic spacetime is an ordered pair (M, gab), where M is a four-dimensional
smooth manifold10 and gab is a smooth Lorentzian metric on M , whose indices are abstract.
11
Then the collection of objects to topologize consists of the Lorentzian metrics on a fixed
7There is another related sense of stability associated with the initial value problem in general relativity:
one says that the evolution of initial data on a Cauchy surface is stable when its map into the evolved
relativistic spacetime is continuous (Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 253). Because this requires considering
only globally hyperbolic spacetimes, here I focus on the ‘geometric’ version of stability.
8While the same question arises for topologies on finite collections of objects, in that case one might hold
out hope to be able to decide by direct comparison.
9I do not attribute to him outright advocacy, since a careful reading reveals an admixture of methodolog-
ical pragmatism: ‘I think it is important [. . . ] to eventually settle on one or possibly two topologies with
which to work. Hardly any economy of thought results if there are hundreds of topologies in use’ ([1971],
p. 73). Moreover, later writings indicate a preference for the methodologically contextualist approach I
take in §5: ‘The topology one chooses in practice depends on what one wants the topology to do’ ([1985],
pp. 175–6).
10One also requires M to be connected, paracompact, and Hausdorff.
11That is, the super- and subscripts of tensor fields like gab label copies of vector spaces in which the fields
reside. See, e.g., (Malament [2012], §1.4).
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manifold M , which I denote L(M).12 The Whitney fine Ck topology, also called the Ck
open topology, may then be defined as follows. First, let hab be some smooth Riemannian
(inverse) metric on M , and define the ‘distance’ function between the kth partial derivatives
of two Lorentz metrics gab and g
′
ab, relative to h
ab and at each point of M , as the scalar field
d(g, g′;h, k) =

[hruhsv(grs − g′rs)(guv − g′uv)]1/2, k = 0,
[ha1b1 · · ·hakbkhruhsv
⊗∇a1 · · · ∇ak(grs − g′rs)∇b1 · · · ∇bk(guv − g′uv)]1/2,
k > 0,
(1)
where ∇ is the Levi-Civita derivative operator compatible with hab. I have omitted the
abstract indices in the arguments of d since they needlessly clutter the notation, and I will
hereafter continue to drop them when they will never be contracted.
The function d(g, g′;h, k) compares g and g′ at each point of M through the Euclidean
distance between the components of their kth order partial derivatives as determined by h.
Then the sets of the form
Bk(g, ;h) = {g′ : sup
M
d(g, g′;h, 0) < , . . . , sup
M
d(g, g′;h, k) < } (2)
constitute a basis for the Ck open topology, where g ranges over all Lorentz metrics,  ranges
over all positive constants,13 and h ranges over all Riemannian (inverse) metrics. One can
view these basis elements as generalizations of the -balls familiar to metric spaces.
But how does one justify the Ck open topology as canonical? For instance, how should
one choose the right value of k? One way is to investigate examples of stability about
which one has a strong intuition, ruling out available topologies that do not meet them. For
example, in discussing a theorem proving the stability of the strong energy condition14 in
the C2 open topology, Lerner writes,
It should be pointed out that [this theorem] is not true in any of the weaker
topologies frequently used [. . . ]. If we agree that any reasonable topology [. . . ]
should allow perturbations preserving the existence of non-zero rest mass, we
may take this as further evidence in favor of the [open] topologies.
(Lerner [1973], p. 28)
Indeed, it seems that virtually all of the results regarding stability and genericity of global
properties of spacetimes have used one of the open topologies. For example, the encyclo-
pedic monograph Global Lorentzian Geometry, which has an entire chapter on ‘stability
of [geodesic] completeness and incompleteness’, defines only the open topologies for these
purposes (Beem et al. [1996], p. 63 & ch. 7).
However widely accepted, the universal appropriateness of the open topologies has not
gone unquestioned. Geroch ([(1970], [1971]) has provided a pair of examples that illustrate
12One might of course also wish to compare spacetimes whose underlying manifolds are not diffeomorphic.
Although Hawking and Ellis ([1973], p. 198) state that this can be done, to my knowledge no one has done
so nontrivially for all spacetimes.
13One can choose a different  for each derivative order, but the resulting basis generates the same topology.
14This is the condition that for any timelike vector ξa at any point of M ,
(
Tab − 12Tgab
)
ξaξb ≥ 0, where
Tab is the stress-energy tensor and T is its trace. See (Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 95) or (Malament [2012],
p. 166).
5
some surprising features of the C0 open topology in particular.15 His first example is a
sequence that seems like it should converge to Minkowski spacetime but in fact does not.
Explicitly, the sequence of metrics
m
gab =
(
1 +
1
m2 + x2 + y2 + z2
)
(dat)(dbt)− (dax)(dbx)− (day)(dby)− (daz)(dbz) (3)
on R4, where t, x, y, z are scalar coordinate fields, does not converge as m → ∞ to the
Minkowski metric
ηab = (dat)(dbt)− (dax)(dbx)− (day)(dby)− (daz)(dbz), (4)
even though the ‘bump,’ remaining centered at the coordinate origin, decreases in amplitude
to zero. This is because
m
g → η in the C0 open topology if and only if for every neighborhood
of the form B0(η, ;h), we have
m
g ∈ B0(η, ;h) for m sufficiently large. But one can always
pick an h growing sufficiently rapidly towards infinity that, for all m, supM d(η,
m
g ;h, 0) =∞.
Geroch’s second example is the one-parameter family
Λ = {λgab : λ > 0}, (5)
with a fixed gab on a non-compact M , which strikingly does not trace out a continuous curve
in the C0 open topology—indeed, it is everywhere discontinuous. To see this, note that
the family is continuous in the C0 open topology if and only if for every λ0 > 0 and every
neighborhood of the form B0(λ0g, ;h), there is a positive open interval I 3 λ0 such that
{λgab : λ ∈ I} ⊆ B0(λ0g, ;h). But, as with the first example, one can pick an h growing
sufficiently rapidly and without bound—recall M is non-compact—so that for any δ 6= 0,
supM d(λ0g, (λ0 + δ)g;h, 0) =∞.
This example is particularly surprising because the elements of Λ have the same represen-
tational capacities—each can represent precisely the same class of spacetimes, and one can
interpret the parameter λ as a mere change of units.16 In fact, one can prove quite general
results regarding the conditions under which a sequence converges or a family is continuous
in the open topologies. Specifically, the following is sketched by Golubitsky and Guillemin
([1973], pp. 43–4):
Proposition 1. Let g, {ng}n∈N be Lorentz metrics on a non-compact manifold M . Then
n
g → g in the open Ck topology on L(M) iff there is a compact C ⊂M such that:
1. for sufficiently large n,
n
g|M−C = g|M−C; and
2.
n
g| int(C) → g| int(C) in the open Ck topology on L(int(C)).
15In fact, they work just as well for any of the Ck open topologies but I follow Geroch in presenting them
in the C0 context where the calculations are simplest.
16It also demonstrates that the open topologies, like the other topologies that I will consider, ‘over-
represent’ the Lorentz metrics on M since in general they represent isometric spacetimes through distinct
points. One can compensate for this defect somewhat by ensuring one constructs only invariant topologies
(Geroch [(1970], pp. 281–2), ones for which the pushforward map induced by any element of the diffeomor-
phism group of M acts on L(M) as a homeomorphism. Indeed, all of the topologies considered in this paper
are invariant in this way.
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In other words, a sequence converges in the Ck open topology just in case its elements
eventually equal the limit point everywhere except at most on (the interior of) a compact
set, a criterion of convergence even stronger than uniform! One can then use this proposition
to prove (see §A.1) a necessary condition for a family of Lorentz metrics to be continuous.
Proposition 2. Suppose that L(M) is given the Ck open topology, with M non-compact. If
f : R→ L(M) is continuous, then for every x0, x1 ∈ R, there is some compact C ⊂M such
that f(x0)|M−C = f(x1)|M−C.
Thus any pair from a continuous one-parameter family of Lorentz metrics must always
be equal everywhere except at most on a compact set. Intuitively, one might picture the
difference between the members of such a pair as a ‘bump in a rug’ that the function f
pushes around. Although the bump may be bigger or smaller, wider or narrower, it always
has compact support. This is clearly a quite restricted class of continuous families. For
example, because any two distinct members from the scale family of metrics given by eq. 5
are equal nowhere, proposition 2 ensures that this family is everywhere discontinuous.
One might object that the discussion of canonicalism was motivated by considering the
connection of stability with physical significance, but Geroch’s examples and propositions
1 and 2 bear on convergence and continuity. Why should problems with the latter bear
on the use of topology for the former? Two responses are on offer. First, if a canoni-
calist would maintain this objection while affirming that continuity and convergence are
worthy of investigation,17 she would already concede her position in suggesting that different
purposes—stability, as opposed to convergence and continuity—may require different topolo-
gies. Second, convergence, continuity and stability are all interdependent, each determined
by a topology’s lattice of open sets. Recall, for instance, that the stability of a property
depends on the existence of a certain open set. Thus it is in a sense easier for a property to
be stable in a finer topology, since there are more open sets available that could be witnesses
to stability. In particular, if a property is stable on a certain set in a given topology T , it
is stable in every topology finer than T . Recall as well that the convergence of a sequence
depends on certain aspects of every open neighborhood of its purported limit point. Thus
it is in a sense easier for a sequence to converge in a coarser topology, since there are fewer
open sets that must fulfill the proper role. In particular, if a sequence converges in a given
topology T , it converges in every topology coarser than T .
Geroch’s examples and propositions 1 and 2 therefore suggest that there are more open
sets in the open topologies than one might have initially thought, which would perhaps
make stability too easily achieved. For example, if a property is stable for g in the C0
open topology on L(M) for non-compact M , then it obtains on some basic neighborhood
B0(g, ;h). However, for any g
′ ∈ B0(g, ;h) distinct from g on a non-compact set, by
choosing h′ = Ωh/d(g, g′;h, 0) for some unbounded Ω, there is no ′ for which g′ ∈ B0(g, ′;h′).
But one might think that whether g′ can be sufficiently close to g, for some standard of
sufficiency, should not depend on the choice of h, which is simply a device for comparing g
17Lerner ([(1972], [1973]) is aware of Geroch’s examples and propositions 1 and 2, but concludes from
them that one must give up talking about continuity and convergence. Considering that topology is typically
introduced (in part) in the first place to treat continuity and convergence, a more measured response would
be to reject the open topologies as canonical.
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and g′. That the open topologies do have this dependence is ultimately what is responsible
for propositions 1 and 2.18
4 Continuity in the Geometric Sense and the Compact-
Open Topologies
Given the problems that the open topologies face, one might very well abandon Lerner’s
suggestion and investigate other possible choices for a canonical topology. One idea comes
from Geroch ([1969]), who has proposed a way of interpreting certain limiting relations
entirely geometrically through the continuity (smoothness, etc.) of certain fields. Roughly,
in the simplest case of a one-parameter family, one constructs a 5-dimensional manifold from
the 4-dimensional manifolds of the family ‘stacked’ by their identifying parameter.
More precisely, suppose that one is given a family of metrics { tgab}t∈R on a fixed manifold
M .19 Let M be a manifold diffeomorphic to M × R and let ψ(t) : M → M be a family of
embeddings defined, using this diffeomorphism, by p 7→ (p, t). Thus the field t˜ : M → R
defined by (p, t) 7→ t is smooth and labels the 4-dimensional hypersurfaces foliating M by
their parameter value t. Then one can define a symmetric field Γab on M with signature
(+,−,−,−, 0) by stipulating that (Γab)|(p,t) = (ψ(t)p )∗( tgab). In other words, Γab is the field
that on each t˜-constant hypersurface is just the pushforward of the inverse Lorentz metric
t
gab. One can find a fixed derivative operator ∇ that is compatible with Γab and ∇at˜, i.e.,
∇aΓbc = 0 and ∇b∇at˜ = 0, and that makes these two fields orthogonal, i.e., Γab∇at˜ = 0.20
Now, for each p ∈ M the points ψ(t)(p) for all t form a smooth curve and the collection
of all such curves for all p form a congruence on M that indicates which points on different
t˜-constant hypersurfaces are counterparts. Thus there is a vector field τa on M tangent to
the curves of this congruence satisfying τa∇at˜ = 1. This allows one at last to define a unique
symmetric field Γab such that Γabτ
a = 0 and ΓabΓ
bc = δca − τ c∇at˜.21 With this construction
in place, we can say that the family
t
gab on M is continuous in the geometric sense when
the corresponding field Γab is continuous everywhere on M. (Analogous definitions would
apply to smoothness, etc.) One can similarly define the limit of a sequence of metrics by
embedding the sequence in a one-parameter family.
A great appeal of this proposal is that it uses the natural, widely accepted geometrical
formulation of a relativistic spacetime to do the work of choosing the canonical topology.
On its face it does not seem to involve the kind of arbitrary decisions used in selecting an
18Like with Geroch’s examples, eqs. 3 and 5, this dependence applies for all the open topologies. I’ve only
presented the C0 case to illustrate it economically.
19Geroch does not require that the metrics be defined on diffeomorphic manifolds, but I can confine
attention to that case here.
20For those familiar with the geometrized formulation of Newtonian gravitation, ∇at˜ functions much like
the temporal metric and Γab like the spatial metric, except that the latter is Lorentzian instead of Riemannian
and only assumed to be smooth on each t˜-constant hypersurface. I would like to thank Jim Weatherall for
emphasizing this point to me.
21This also parallels the construction of the covariant spatial metric in geometrized Newtonian gravitation.
Cf. fn. 20 and (Malament [2012], p. 254, proposition 4.1.12).
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open topology. It turns out that the topology determined by all the families continuous in
the geometric sense is well-known:
Proposition 3. A family of Lorentz metrics { tg}t∈R is continuous in the geometric sense iff
it is continuous in the C0 compact-open topology.22
(For a proof, see §A.2.) A basis for the Ck compact-open topologies, for any non-negative
integer k, may be written as sets of the form
Bk(g, ;h,C) = {g′ : sup
C
d(g, g′;h, 0) < , . . . , sup
C
d(g, g′;h, k) < }, (6)
where g ranges over all Lorentz metrics,  ranges over all positive constants, h ranges over all
Riemannian (inverse) metrics,23 and C ranges over all compact subsets of M . The essential
difference between the open and the compact-open topologies is that the former ‘control’
behavior everywhere on the manifold whereas the latter do so only on compact subsets.
Notably, one can show that, unlike with the open topologies, the sequence defined by
eq. 3 converges to the Minkowski metric and the family defined by eq. 5 is continuous rel-
ative to the Ck compact-open topologies. These topologies are also attractive for having
a number of other interesting features. First, they coincide with the topology of Ck com-
pact convergence—that is, a sequence of metrics
n
g → g on M just when it and its partial
derivatives to order k (with respect to the Levi-Civita derivative operator compatible with
an arbitrary Riemannian metric on M) do so uniformly on each compact C ⊆M (Munkres
[2000], p. 283, theorem 46.2).24 Second, if a sequence of Ck metrics
n
g converges to g, then
g is guaranteed to be at least Ck as well (Munkres [2000], p. 284, corollary 46.6). Third,
there is a close connection with homotopy. One can show that a family of Lorentz metrics
is continuous in the Ck compact-open topology if and only if it traces out a Ck path in
L(M). So, in a way, the Ck compact-open topology encodes which Lorentz metrics can be
continuously (to order k) deformed into one another.25
Like with the open topologies, however, Geroch has criticized the general appropriateness
of the compact-open topologies, contending that they rule counterintuitively on the sequence
of metrics
m
g ′ab =
(
1 +
m
1 + (x−m)2
)
(dat)(dbt)− (dax)(dbx)− (day)(dby)− (daz)(dbz) (7)
on R4, where t, x, y, z are natural scalar coordinate fields.26 ‘The “bump” in the metrics
becomes larger as it recedes to infinity’, he writes, but the ‘sequence does approach Minkowski
22In particular, the C0 compact-open topologies are the final topologies respectively associated with the
families continuous in the geometric sense, the finest topologies on L(M) that make those families continuous.
23Strictly speaking, letting h range is superfluous, as the same topology is generated through a single
choice (Geroch [(1970], p. 280 fn.).
24The compact-open topology coincides with the topology of compact convergence on a function space
when the range of the functions is a metrizable space (Munkres [2000], pp. 285–6), and the bundle of Lorentz
tensors over M , being a finite-dimensional manifold, is metrizable.
25Equivalently, the family is continuous in the Ck compact-open topology just when the k-jets of the
family belong to the same path component.
26The formula for the first term is garbled in (Geroch [1971], p. 71), but appears without error in (Geroch
[(1970], p. 280).
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space in the [C0 compact-open] topology (because the metrics become Minkowskian in every
compact set)’ ([1971], p. 71). In other words, since d(η,
m
g ′;h, 0) is continuous for any choice
of (smooth) Riemannian h, its supremum is bounded on any compact set and will become
as small as one likes for sufficiently large m. However, ‘[i]ntuitively, we would not think of
this sequence as approaching Minkowski space’ ([1971], p. 71) (or presumably any spacetime
at all). Thus he takes the C0 compact-open topology to be too coarse.
This example is less convincing than his examples for the open topology. It is instructive
to compare eq. 7 with the sequence of Taylor expansions of a real function like sin(x). For any
particular finite-order expansion, one can find a sufficiently large x such that the expansion,
evaluated at this x, differs from sin(x) by as much as one wishes. But if one fixes some
compact region of R, then the Taylor series converges uniformly on that region. Similarly,
the sequence given by eq. 7 converges to Minkowski spacetime because the C0 compact-
open topology corresponds with the topology of compact convergence. Just as the compact
convergence of Taylor expansions seems perfectly reasonable, it is not clear why the same
cannot be said in the case of sequences of Lorentz metrics.
However, there are other counterintuitive features of the compact-open topologies that
bear even more directly on stability. For example, consider Hawking’s theorem (Hawking
and Ellis [1973], p. 198, proposition 6.4.9):
Theorem 1 (Hawking). The existence of a global time function on a relativistic spacetime
is equivalent to stable causality, an absence of closed causal curves that is stable in the open
C0 topology.
If one of the compact-open topologies were to be canonical, one would want to know whether
Hawking’s theorem holds with respect to it as well. It turns out that it does not, and
spectacularly so. In fact, according to the compact-open topologies, spacetimes generically
contain closed timelike curves.
Proposition 4. Chronology violating spacetimes are generic in L(M) in any of the Ck
compact-open topologies.27
Corollary 1. No Lorentz metric is stably causal in any of the Ck compact-open topologies
on L(M).28
In particular, according to the compact-open topologies, not only does Minkowski space-
time fail to be stably causal despite its global time function, it turns out that not having
closed timelike curves is not physically significant! In other words, one would never have
warrant to infer from a model of relativistic spacetime that the physical situation it repre-
27This slightly improves statements by Hawking ([1971], pp. 396–7) and Hawking and Ellis ([1973], p. 198),
who advert without proof to the density of chronology violating spacetimes in L(M) in any of the Ck
compact-open topologies.
28Cf. proposition 5.1 of (Manchak [unpublished]), which shows that each Lorentz metric is homotopic
to one that violates chronology. As alluded to above, there is a close connection between homotopy and
the compact-open topologies: the Ck homotopy classes correspond with the path components of the Ck
compact-open topologies.
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sents does not permit a form of time travel.29 An alternative but equivalent definition of
stable causality brings out why: a spacetime (M, g) is stably causal with respect to the C0
open topology just when there is a metric g′ for which there are no closed causal curves and
whose light cones everywhere lie outside those of g. By contrast, when stable causality is
defined with respect to the C0 compact-open topology, the light cones of g′ need only lie
outside of those of g on a compact subset of M , leaving the rest unconstrained and ripe for
the sprouting of closed causal curves.
By contrast, if (M, g) already contains a closed timelike curve γ : I → M , then one can
pick a local basis element Bk(g, ;h,C) from any compact-open topology so that γ[I] ⊆ C
and  is small enough so that, for any g′ ∈ Bk(g, ;h,C), γ is still g′-timelike.
Proposition 5. Every spacetime containing a closed timelike curve does so stably in any of
the Ck compact-open topologies.
Thus one always has warrant to infer from spacetimes with closed timelike curves that they
represent the possibility for a type of time travel. One ought also, for some relativistic
spacetime models without closed timelike curves, have warrant to infer that they do not
represent this possibility. That this never occurs under the compact-open topologies militates
against taking any of them as canonical.
5 Methodological Contextualism
Any canonical topology on L(M) should have the ability to properly distinguish which se-
quences converge, which families are continuous, and which properties are stable or generic.
But as the previous two sections laid out, the two main classes of topologies in the litera-
ture fall short of these goals. The open topologies, advocated by Lerner, seem too fine to
treat convergence and continuity. The compact-open topologies, naturally suggested through
continuity in the geometric sense, seem too coarse for stable causality because their neighbor-
hoods control behavior only on compact sets. Of course, that Geroch’s examples do evince
genuine problems for the former can well be challenged, and one may decide, according to
one’s inclinations, to bite the bullets of propositions 1 and 2, or 4, but this does not com-
pletely resolve the issue of how to choose the canonical topology. Proponents of a canonical
topology must decide without being ad hoc on which counterintuitive results to accept and
are obliged to provide an explanation as to why the intuitive features thereby denied do not
have the significance they seemed to.
The considerations already raised for the canonicalist can be cast in terms of a no-go
result. Given some manifold M , proposition 3 entails that the C0 compact-open topology
on L(M) is the finest topology in which all the one-parameter families continuous in the
geometric sense are continuous. (See fn. 22.) But it follows from corollary 1 that no Lorentz
metric is stably causal in the C0 compact-open topology or any topology coarser than it.
So if there is some Lorentz metric on M that admits of a global time function, Hawking’s
29This result does not state that one can have no inductive evidence for certain global properties, as one
might interpret proposition 2 of (Manchak [2011], p. 414). Rather, it states that even if one had data for the
whole universe, however imprecise, and fit that data to a relativistic spacetime, one could never conclude that
there were no closed timelike curves in the universe if one takes any compact-open topology as canonical.
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theorem fails for it in such a topology. (Without the existence of such a metric, Hawking’s
theorem is vacuous.) This yields the following.
Proposition 6. If there is some Lorentz metric on M that admits of a global time function,
then there is no topology on L(M) relative to which both
1. all one-parameter families continuous in the geometric sense are continuous, and
2. Hawking’s theorem holds.
One might object that asking for such compatibility is too much; perhaps there is hope for
compatibility with a weakened version of Hawking’s theorem, in which one demands the
existence of a global time function just in case the spacetime is stably causal when restricted
to compact sets (or rather their interiors). But this fails, too.
Corollary 2. Suppose TM is a topology on L(M), for any M , that makes continuous all the
one-parameter families continuous in the geometric sense. Then, for any g ∈ L(M) there is
no compact C ⊆M such that g| int(C) is stably causal in the topology Tint(C) on L(int(C)).
Because there are no subsets ofM with the desired property, the analog of Hawking’s theorem
fails (as there remain many spacetimes with global time functions).30 This is just one of a
possibly large family of ‘no-go’ results that the canonicalist must face.
But reminding oneself of the way these topologies are used suggests that one need not pick
any canonical topology at all. Examining the consequences of adopting one topology over
another is a part of the process of deciding which topology will be relevant for a given type
of problem. Hawking has emphasized as much: ‘A given property may be stable or generic
in some topologies and not in others. Which of these topologies is of physical interest will
depend on the nature of the property under consideration’ ([1971], p. 396). Indeed, Geroch’s
later writings (see fn. 9) have indicated the same. If different topologies correspond to
different ways one can specify how spacetimes are similar, it is not surprising that different
topologies would be natural choices for different kinds of questions if those questions bear
upon different kinds of properties. It thus seems best to accept a kind of methodological
contextualism, where the best choice of topology is the one that captures, as best as one can
manage, at least the properties relevant to the type of question at hand, ones that relevantly
similar spacetimes should share. Thus, in contrast to the canonicalist, I would demand that
particular choices of topology must be justified relative to a context as much as one feasibly
can.
Methodological contextualism about topologies—at least in the sense of allowing oneself
to pick the most appropriate topology for a given application instead of deciding on one
in advance—would make all the above worries associated with picking a canonical topol-
ogy moot. But the contextualist fortunately still has the resources to choose reasonable
topologies—resources not so different from the canonicalists, but without the demand to
30In fact, the stated weakening of stable causality with respect to the C0 open topology is known to
be equivalent to non-total imprisonment, the condition that no future-inextendible causal curve eventually
enters but does not leave some compact subset of spacetime (Minguzzi [2009], theorem 1). That non-total
imprisonment is much weaker than stable causality reveals that finding a weakening of stable causality that
preserves Hawking’s theorem is a subtle matter.
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select a single topology for all purposes. One will expect that similar questions will tend
to demand similar topologies, so the process of justification need not be started afresh each
time. In particular, one should arrive at a particular choice of topology through reflective
equilibrium, balancing the demands of the current understanding of what different topologies
capture physically and what notions of similarity one is trying to capture with the implica-
tions of new mathematical results, as the many examples and propositions of §3–4 did for
the open and compact-open topologies. These new results may then change one’s intuitions,
which in turn may suggest further results to investigate. The more one can accumulate these
kinds of facts, the more there will be relevant data at hand for a particular type of inquiry so
that one can make a sharper, better justified conceptual decision regarding which topology
to use. Sometimes this will lead one to reject initially promising and intuitive choices, and
sometimes it will reinforce them. One need not postulate that this reflective equilibrium
lead to a stable limit; even if one has accumulated many results in favor of using a partic-
ular topology for some narrow type of inquiry, one should still be open to new facts and
connections that will disturb one’s equilibrium.31
Nevertheless, more work needs to be done characterizing how particular choices of topol-
ogy may be appropriate for a given kind of question. Consider again, for example, Hawking’s
stability criterion for physical significance. Per the discussion at the end of §3, one might
expect that some topologies fine enough for the stability of some properties—like the open
topologies—are too fine for certain sequences to converge, or vice versa—like the compact-
open topologies. So the topologies that might be natural candidates for inquiries about phys-
ical significance through stability may be different from those for inquiries about continuity
or convergence.32 At least in the case of stability, one may be able to characterize classes of
properties to which particular topologies are (in)sensitive, or the range of topologies in which
interesting properties, like stable causality, behave as one might expect. The usual classifica-
tion of spacetime properties into local and global (Manchak [2011], p. 413) is too coarse for
these purposes.33 Part of the difficulty in answering this question for stability—indeed, for
any inquiry—stems from the small variety of topologies used in the literature.34 Theorems
about the stability and genericity of global properties generally use the open topologies (e.g.,
see Hawking and Ellis ([1973], p. 198), Lerner ([1973]), and Beem et al. ([1996], ch. 7)). The-
orems about the stability of Cauchy developments use variants on the coarser compact-open
topologies (see Hawking ([1971], p. 398–9) and Hawking and Ellis ([1973], p. 252–254)). The-
31One can find this dynamic and non-teleological conception of reflective equilibrium in the literature on
moral theorizing as well (Schroeter [2004]).
32I do not preclude there being different contexts in which the same kind of question ultimately demands
a different topology. There may very well be different inquiries into physical significance, for example, that
are best served by different choices.
33This classification takes a property P of a spacetime (M, g) to be local if and only if all spacetimes locally
isometric to (M, g) also have P , and global otherwise. Thus both the topology of M and the existence of
a closed timelike curve are global properties, whereas only the latter has any hope of having an analog to
proposition 4.
34One pocket of innovation in this regard has been the community working on causal set theory, one
proposal for a theory of quantum gravity. (For an introduction, see Henson ([2009], [2012]).) They have
proposed topologies on L(M) that treat the conformal and causal structure of spacetime separately, al-
though some (Bombelli and Meyer [1989]) suffer problems similar to those of the open topologies, and others
(Noldus [2002]) are restricted to globally hyperbolic spacetimes, hence are inappropriate for studying, e.g.,
the stability of causality conditions. A fuller discussion of these, however, lies outside the scope of this paper.
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orems concerning the convergence of relativistic spacetimes to Newtonian spacetimes (e.g.,
Malament ([1986])) have (implicitly) used a point-open topology, which is even coarser.35
It turns out that there is a simple modification to the C0 open topology that makes the
one-parameter families defined by eq. 5 everywhere continuous while, unlike the compact-
open topology, still preventing the sequence defined by eq. 7 from converging. Take the basis
elements of the C0 open topology (eq. 2), but restricted only to bounded pairs (g, h), ones
for which supM d(g, λg;h, 0) < ∞ for any positive λ. This prohibits choosing any h that
grows too rapidly, eliminating the open neighborhoods of each Lorentzian g that forced eq. 5
to be everywhere discontinuous. One can show, moreover, that this topology lies between
the open and compact-open topologies in coarseness. However the sequence defined by eq. 3
still does not converge to Minkowski spacetime according to this topology, so it still would
not rule in the intuitively ‘right’ way according to Geroch.
But if further refinements are found that produce a topology satisfying Geroch’s desider-
ata, might that topology end up being satisfactory for all demands? If I allow for the possi-
bility that the methods available for picking an appropriate topology may eventually single
out a unique choice, or perhaps very few, to what extent is methodological contextualism
really distinguished from a slightly liberalized canonicalism? The answer is methodological.
The two positions are not distinct because of differing ends—whether to use one topology
or many—but because of their differing means: what grounds we might have to prefer one
topology over another, and how those grounds need to be articulated. A canonicalist holds
that because there are definitive reasons always to choose a single topology (or perhaps very
few), there is no further reason to say why that choice is appropriate for a given type of
inquiry. By contrast, the contextualist takes the relevant reasons to be provided by the
type of problem at hand, not in advance, and that they should therefore be articulated and
reasonably defended. It bears emphasizing that the latter does not deny that there can be
principled reasons to pick out a certain topology, only that those reasons can ever be given
in enough generality to preclude attention to the details of the type of situation at hand. We
indeed be may be lucky for the sake of our economy of thought if a few topologies are always
appropriate, but we should not obstruct the development of new ones if they fit particular
purposes better.
A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Continuity and the open topologies
Proposition 2. Suppose that L(M) is given the Ck open topology, with M non-compact. If
f : R→ L(M) is continuous, then for every x0, x1 ∈ R, there is some compact C ⊂M such
that f(x0)|M−C = f(x1)|M−C.36
Proof. The case where f is a constant function is immediate, so suppose otherwise and pick
arbitrary distinct x0, x1 ∈ R, assuming without loss of generality that x0 < x1. I claim that,
35The point-open topologies are defined similarly to the compact-open topologies (eq. 6), but require that
the suprema be taken over only finitely many points in each basis element instead of over compact sets.
36This proposition may be generalized to families of Lorentz metrics parameterized by any path-connected
space.
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given any r ∈ [x0, x1], there is an open (relative to [x0, x1]) interval Ir ⊆ [x0, x1], containing
r, such that for any q ∈ Ir, there is some compact C(r, q) ⊂ M for which f(r)|M−C(r,q) =
f(q)|M−C(r,q). For suppose otherwise, and consider any sequence of intervals I1r ⊃ I2r ⊃ . . .
such that Inr ⊆ [x0, x1] for each n and
⋂∞
n=1 I
n
r = {r}. One can then construct by induction
a sequence of metrics that converges to f(r). For the base step, let Is1r = I
1
r and note that
there is some q1 ∈ Is1r distinct from r such that f(r)|M−C 6= f(q1)|M−C for any compact
C ⊂ M . (Such a q1 6= r exists because f is continuous.) For the inductive step, suppose
Isnr is given so that there is some qn ∈ Isnr distinct from r such that f(r)|M−C 6= f(qn)|M−C
for any compact C ⊂ M . Then pick some Isn+1r such that sn+1 > sn and qn /∈ Isn+1r , noting
that there is some qn+1 ∈ Isn+1r distinct from r such that f(r)|M−C 6= f(qn+1)|M−C for any
compact C ⊂ M . The induction is complete, so by construction the sequence qn → r as
n → ∞, and for each n, f(r)|M−C 6= f(qn)|M−C for any compact C ⊂ M . But because f
is continuous, it follows that f(qn) → f(r) as n → ∞ (Munkres [2000], p. 130, theorem
21.3), and by proposition 1, this implies in turn that there is a compact C ⊂ M for which
f(r)|M−C = f(qn)|M−C for sufficiently large n, which is a contradiction.
Next, note that the {Ir : r ∈ [x0, x1]} form an open cover of [x0, x1] (relative to [x0, x1]).
The interval is compact, so by definition there is some finite subcover {Iri : i = 1, . . . ,m},
each of whose elements has, for all q ∈ Iri , an associated compact C(ri, q) ⊂ M for which
f(ri)|M−C(ri,q) = f(q)|M−C(ri,q). One may assume, without loss of generality, that r1 < . . . <
rm and that, because the interval is one-dimensional, no point of [x0, x1] is included in more
than two of the Iri . Thus pick any qi ∈ Iri ∩ Iri+1 for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and put q0 = x0 and
qm = x1. Let C =
⋃
i=1,...,mC(ri, qi−1) ∪ C(ri, qi) and observe that
f(x0)|M−C = f(q0)|M−C = f(r1)|M−C = f(q1)|M−C = · · ·
= f(qm−1)|M−C = f(rm)|M−C = f(qm)|M−C = f(x1)|M−C .
Since C is compact and x0, x1 were arbitrary, the proof is complete.
A.2 Equivalence of continuity in the geometric sense and compact-
open continuity
To prove proposition 3, it will be helpful to use the bundles of Lorentz tensors over M
and degenerate metrics over M × R, denoted Lˆ(M) and Γˆ(M,R), respectively. The desired
equivalence is essentially a corollary of the following (adapted from Munkres ([2000], p. 287,
Theorem 46.11)).
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be topological spaces, and give the set of continuous functions from
X to Y , denoted C(X, Y ), the (C0) compact-open topology. If f : X ×Z → Y is continuous,
then so is the induced function F : Z → C(X, Y ) defined by the equation (F (z))(x) = f(x, z).
The converse holds if X is locally compact37 and Hausdorff.
Proposition 3. A family of Lorentz metrics { tg}t∈R on M is continuous in the geometric
sense iff it is continuous in the C0 compact-open topology.38
37A topological space is locally compact when each point has a compact neighborhood.
38Using jet bundles (Golubitsky and Guillemin [1973], ch. 2.2–2.3), this proposition may be generalized to
any Ck compact-open topology and families of Lorentz metrics parameterized by any smooth manifold.
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Proof. Let ψ
(t)
p : M → M × R be the embeddings that define the 5-dimensional metric Γab,
which corresponds to a cross-section Γ˜ of a bundle Γˆ(M,R) of 5-dimensional metrics. The
bundle homomorphism φ : Γˆ(M,R)→ Lˆ(M) defined by φ(Γ˜′|(p,t)) = (ψ(t)p )∗(Γ′ab), for any local
section Γ˜′ at (p, t) ∈M ×R, is smooth because by definition the ψ(t)p are jointly smooth in p
and t. Thus, if the family
t
gab is continuous in the geometric sense, f = φ◦Γ˜ : M×R→ Lˆ(M)
is continuous. Lemma 1 then entails that the map F : R→ C(M, Lˆ(M)) defined by F : t 7→
t
gˆ,
where
t
gˆ is the cross-section of Lˆ(M) corresponding to
t
gab, is continuous when its range is
given the C0 compact-open topology.
Conversely, suppose that the family
t
gab is continuous in the C
0 compact-open topology,
i.e., that F : R → C(M, Lˆ(M)) defined above is continuous. Since M is locally compact
and Hausdorff, lemma 1 entails that f : M × R → Lˆ(M) is continuous. Thus ( tgab)|p is
jointly continuous in t and p. Note that Γab is continuous when, for any smooth field αab on
M × R, αabΓab is continuous. Now, for any (p, t) ∈ M × R, (αabΓab)|ψ(t)(p) = (ψ(t)p )∗(αab) tgab;
by assumption (ψ
(t)
p )∗(αab) is smooth; and
t
gab is continuous because its inverse is. Thus Γab
is continuous, so Γab must be so as well by construction.
A.3 Stable causality and the compact-open topologies
The proof of proposition 4 uses proposition 5, but because the latter is a straightforward
computation, the order of presentation follows that of the main text. First, a lemma is
required allowing one to ‘interpolate’ between any spacetime and a chronology-violating
region of Go¨del spacetime.39
Lemma 2. Let (M, g) and (R4, g′) be two spacetimes. For any open S ⊂ M and any open
R ⊂ R4 with compact closure, there is a spacetime (M, g′) such that g′|M−S = g|M−S and g′|R
is isometric to g′|U for some U ⊂ S.40
Proof. Pick a chart (V, ϕ) of M such that V ⊆ S and ϕ[V ] is an open ball of radius 4, i.e.,
ϕ[V ] = BR4(~0, 4) = {~x ∈ R4 : ‖~x‖ < 4}, where ‖ · ‖ is the Euclidean norm on the coordinates
~x ∈ R4. For brevity, define Ai = ϕ−1[BR4(~0, i)] for i = 1, 2, 3, and let r be a scalar field on V
defined by r|p = ‖ϕ(p)‖. Finally, let ψ : R4 → V be a diffeomorphism such that ψ[R] ⊆ A1
and define U = ψ[R].
Because all Lorentz metrics on R4 are homotopic (Finkelstein and Misner [1959]), ψ∗(g′)
is homotopic to g|V , considering V as a submanifold. Thus there is some continuous function
f : [0, 1]→ L(V ) such that f(0) = ψ∗(g′) and f(1) = g|V . One can then define the continuous
Lorentz metric
γ|p =

g|p, p ∈M − A3,
f(r|p − 2)|p, p ∈ A3 − A2,
[ψ∗(g′)]|p, p ∈ A2.
39For more on the properties of Go¨del spacetime, see (Malament [2012], ch. 3.1).
40Following (Manchak [unpublished]), one can use this lemma to answer affirmatively a question posed
by (Stein [1970], p. 594) about whether it is always possible to continuously deform a spacetime into one
containing a closed timelike curve.
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In order to produce the desired smooth metric g′, one can convolve γ with an appropriate
positive, symmetric mollifier on the region V − A1. In more detail, define w : R→ R to be
the smooth function
w(x) =
{
ce−1/(1−x
2), |x| < 1
0, |x| ≥ 1,
where c is a positive constant chosen so that
∫
Rw(x)dx = 1. Further, define W : R
n ×
[0,∞) → R as the jointly smooth function W (~x, ) = −nw(‖~x‖/), where W (~x, 0) =
limδ→0W (~x, δ) is the Dirac delta, the convergence being understood in the distributional
sense. Now, one can express γ in terms of its matrix components γαβ(~x) determined by the
chart (V, ϕ), allowing one to define on ϕ[V − A1] for some fixed  the new components
γ˜αβ(~x) =
∫
ϕ[int(V−A1)]
W (~x− ~y, ec−1w(‖~x‖ − 5/2))γαβ(~y)d~y, (8)
which are smooth on ϕ[V − A1].41 Moreover, for sufficiently small , the γ˜αβ approximate
the γαβ arbitrarily well on V − A1.42 Therefore such γ˜αβ are the components of a smooth
Lorentz metric γ˜ on V − A1. Note that, in the integrand of eq. 8 the function W becomes
the Dirac delta for ‖~x‖ ≥ 7/2 and ‖~x‖ ≤ 3/2, so on the points of V corresponding to these
coordinate regions, γ˜ is equal to g and ψ∗(g′), respectively. We can define at last
g′|p =

g|p, p ∈M − V,
γ˜|p, p ∈ V − A1,
[ψ∗(g′)]|p, p ∈ A1.
By construction, g′|M−S = g|M−S since M − S ⊆ M − V and g′|U is isometric to g′|R since
g′|A1 = [ψ∗(g
′)]|A1 and U = ψ[R] ⊆ A1.
Proposition 4. Chronology violating spacetimes are generic in L(M) for every compact-
open topology.
Proof. Every spacetime with a compact M contains timelike curves (Hawking and Ellis
[1973], p. 189, proposition 6.4.2), so suppose M is non-compact. Select any neighborhood
N(g) of an arbitrary g, which must contain a set of the form Bk(g, ;h,C). Letting S =
M − C, by lemma 2 there is some g′ ∈ N(g) such that g′|U is isometric to a chronology
violating region of Go¨del spacetime for some U ⊂M −C. By proposition 5, there is an open
neighborhood of g′ consisting only of chronology violating metrics. Let Ak(g,N(g), Bk) be the
union of all such open neighborhoods determined by the choices of g, N(g), and Bk(g, ;h,C),
and consider A =
⋃
g
⋃
N(g)
⋃
Bk
Ak(g,N(g), Bk). By construction, every neighborhood N(g)
of each g contains an element of A, i.e., A is dense in L(M); A is open, being the union
of open sets; and A contains only chronology violating spacetimes. So by definition the
chronology violating spacetimes are generic in L(M).
41This follows essentially from theorem 2.6 of Oden and Reddy ([1976], pp. 48–49).
42Theorem 2.7 of (Oden and Reddy [1976], p. 49) shows that, for the case where the integrand contains
W (~x− ~y, δ) with a fixed δ, the analog of eq. 8 would converge to γαβ as δ → 0 in Lp(ϕ[int(V −A1)])-norm.
As before (cf. footnote 41), allowing δ to smoothly vary introduces no new complications.
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Proposition 5. If the spacetime (M, g) contains a closed timelike curve, then g is stably
chronology violating in every compact-open topology.
Proof. Fix any Riemannian metric hab and note that one can write gab = hamµ
mhbnµ
m−hab
for some smooth vector field µa (Hawking and Ellis [1973], p. 39). One can thus express that
γ : I → M is a closed g-timelike curve with unit tangent vector ξa as the condition that
|habξaµb||γ[I] > (habξaξb)1/2|γ[I]. Pick
 = inf
γ[I]
min
{
1,
( |habξaµb|
(habξaξb)1/2
− 1
)2}
,
and consider any g′ ∈ B0(g, ;h,C), where γ[I] ⊆ C. Writing g′ab = hamµ′mhbnµ′m− hab, γ is
g′-timelike just in case |habξaµ′b||γ[I] > (habξaξb)1/2|γ[I]. Now, one can calculate that
hamhbn(gab−g′ab)(gmn−g′mn) = hamhbn(µaµb−µ′aµ′b)(µmµn−µ′mµ′n) = [hab(µa−µ′a)(µb−µ′b)]2,
so putting ηa = µ′a − µa yields that supC habηaηb < . (The remaining calculations involve
fields defined on γ[I], so the subscript indicating as much will be omitted.) It follows from
this inequality and the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality that
|habξaηb| ≤ (habξaξb)1/2(habηaηb)1/2 < (habξaξb)1/2 ≤ (habξaξb)1/2, (9)
where the last inequality uses the fact that, by definition,  ≤ 1. Then the reverse triangle
inequality entails that
|habξaµ′b| = |habξa(µb + ηb)| ≥
∣∣|habξaµb| − |habξaηb|∣∣ = |habξaµb| − |habξaηb|,
where the last equality follows since |habξaµb| > (habξaξb)1/2 > |habξaηb| by the hypothesis
and equation 9. Applying this equation again along with the definition of  yields that
|habξaµ′b| > |habξaµb|−(habξaξb)1/2 ≥ |habξaµb|−(habξaξb)1/2
∣∣∣∣ |habξaµb|(habξaξb)1/2 − 1
∣∣∣∣ = (habξaξb)1/2.
Thus γ is g′-timelike, but g′ was arbitrary so each element of B0(g, ;h,C) contains a closed
timelike curve. Since B0(g, ;h,C) is open in every C
k compact-open topology, g must be
stably chronology violating in each.
Corollary 2. Suppose TM is a topology on L(M), for any M , that makes continuous all the
one-parameter families continuous in the geometric sense. Then, for any g ∈ L(M) there is
no compact C ⊆M such that g| int(C) is stably causal in the topology Tint(C) on L(int(C)).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary g ∈ L(M) and a compact C ⊆M . By corollary 1, g| int(C) is not
stably causal in the C0 compact-open topology on L(int(C)). But if TM makes continuous
all the one-parameter families continuous in the geometric sense, it follows from proposition
3 that it is no finer that the C0 compact-open topology, hence g| int(C) is not stably causal in
the topology Tint(C) on L(int(C)) either.
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